, and that the emancipatory rhetoric of BPR thinly masks a political agenda of managerial control ( Grint et al., 1996; Jones 1995; Willcocks and Smith, 1995) . Jones (1995) claims that BPR is beset by contradictions that "lie at the heart of the concept itself" (p. 43).
Such criticisms, however strident, cannot be dismissed by managers and academics seeking a serious evaluation of BPR's role in business improvement. Nor can they be accepted at face value as evidence that process re-engineering is a bad idea. Rather, direct examination and critical scrutiny of contradictions is necessary in order to assess the value of BPR. We pursue this examination in this paper. Our analysis of contradictions leads us to propose alternative theoretical approaches to BPR research and practice. Theories that employ a "logic of contradiction" are likely to offer greater insight into contradictory practices such as BPR, as well as the more general issue of organizational change (Ford and Ford, 1994; Poole and Van de Ven, 1989; Robey, 1995; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995) . Thus, rather than adding to the criticism of BPR, we seek to understand BPR's logical inconsistencies and contradictory results. We argue that a better theoretical understanding can improve both empirical research on BPR's implications for organizational performance and, ultimately, applied re-engineering efforts.
We first examine problems in the evaluation of BPR programmes which help to produce the impression that BPR is contradictory. Two such problems are defining what process re-engineering really is and assessing whether BPR has been successfully applied. We then examine four contradictions in BPR's analysis of organizations: the fallacy of BPR's "clean-slate" assumption, the paradox of information technology's role as an enabler of organizational change, the hypocrisy of employee empowerment, and the irony of employee commitment. Finally, we offer specific recommendations for theoretical approaches capable of addressing these contradictions, thereby guiding research and practice.
Evaluating process re-engineering initiatives
Little reliable evidence exists confirming that BPR has delivered on its initial promise (Cummings, 1993) . Despite acknowledged successes at Ford, CIGNA, Mutual Benefit Life Insurance, Wal-Mart, and other firms, most observers express concern over the high failure rates of BPR projects. Champy (1995) , one of the originators of BPR, recently admitted that "reengineering is in trouble… Substantial reengineering payoffs appear to have fallen well short of their potential".
Empirical studies provide mixed evidence regarding the success of BPR. On the one hand, researchers at CSC Index reported that approximately one-fourth of the re-engineering projects they had studied in north America were not meeting their goals (Cafasso, 1993) . The authors of this study, however, speculated that the failure rate was "on the order of 70 per cent". In another industry survey conducted by Deloitte & Touche in 1993, CIOs indicated that the actual benefits of BPR projects had generally fallen short of expectations.
On a scale of one to ten, the average ratings on such categories of BPR benefits as quality, cost reduction, and competitiveness were all below five (Hayley et al., 1993) . On the other hand, more positive evidence about the success of re-engineering has been obtained in some studies. Bergeron and Limayem (1995) , for example, observed a success rate of 70 per cent among Canadian firms. In another study, again conducted among Canadian organizations, Bergeron and Falardeau (1994) refer to a success rate of 75 per cent.
The inconsistent empirical results regarding the effectiveness of BPR programmes can be traced to two major problems. First, despite its identity as a revolutionary approach to organizational improvement, BPR programmes vary considerably in basic conception and method. Thus, research that attempts to assess BPR's impacts must first resolve controversies surrounding the definition of BPR. Second, it has never been clear how success and failure in BPR programmes should be judged. Should BPR programmes be held to their original promise of "order-of-magnitude" improvements, thereby rendering more incremental improvements as failures? Or should BPR be credited with improvements of any sort? We address each of these issues briefly below.
The diverse conceptions and methods of BPR
While most writers emphasize the features of radical change and the enabling role of information technology, the term re-engineering has always meant different things to different people (Margolis, 1992) . Marchand and Stanford (1995) noted that BPR has taken a dozen different meanings, from redesigning discrete work tasks to forcing radical change throughout the organization. Such differences in meaning may align with professional interests and expertise ( Gallivan, 1996; Jones, 1994) . Jones (1994) , for instance, reported that within a management consulting firm, BPR was viewed as an occasion for open discourse, whereas information technology consultants viewed BPR as an information systems development methodology and toolkit. In a third organization, BPR was regarded as an offshoot of soft systems methodology. As Jones (1994) noted: ...none of the organizations studied could be described as following Hammer's approach in more than the loosest sense… [reengineering] is a rather free-floating concept, widely felt to be important, but which nobody can quite define and which is appropriated in organizations for particular ends depending on their circumstances (p. 373).
Moreover, Carr and Johansson (1995) cite the results of a study produced by Forrester Research in which 50 surveyed organizations claimed to be reengineering business processes. Among those organizations, only 30 per cent were pursuing orthodox re-engineering, 42 per cent were engaged in efforts leading to incremental changes, and 28 per cent were not re-engineering at all. These findings and others (e.g. Grint et al., 1996) suggest that many different change approaches are being pursued under the name of process reengineering.
Re-engineering is also pursued using a variety of methods that operate on fundamentally different models of work processes (Grover and Kettinger, 1995) . Information models use semantic data models, object models, and data flow diagrams to build a picture of existing and desired processes. Role activity models use flowcharts to trace the activities and responsibilities of different roles involved in a process. Simulation models allow for experimentation using Monte Carlo simulation. Most recently, workflow management tools have been applied to BPR projects (Swenson and Irwin, 1995) . To date, no comprehensive re-engineering methods have appeared that accomplish everything that each of these models allows (Barrett, 1996) . Thus, it is almost pointless to speak of reengineering methods without clearly specifying what modelling approach is being used.
As a result of this diversity in conception and method, it is virtually impossible to conduct a simple assessment of the effectiveness of "BPR". BPR means too many things and can be fashioned in too many different ways to be understood as "something" that affects organizational performance. Research that seeks a direct association between BPR and performance is bound to be confounded by local interpretations of BPR and specific methods of implementation. Thus, it is no surprise that the results of such research tend to be contradictory.
The problem of judging success in re-engineering initiatives
Beyond the difficulty of finding an unequivocal definition for BPR, there is inconsistency in the way that BPR success is defined and measured. Because there is no generally accepted measure to assess the outcomes of re-engineering, it is wrong to assume that the rates of success from different studies can be reliably compared. CSC Index, for one, uses a narrow definition of failure that includes any project "either completely abandoned or changed for something more incremental" (Cafasso, 1993) . But should a re-engineering project that fails to achieve the "stretch" targets demanded by the purists, such as "100 percent or even tenfold improvement" (Hammer and Champy, 1993) , be classified as a failure? If a project attains "only" an 80 per cent improvement, has it been unsuccessful? Moreover, should "success" be only measured in terms of objective criteria, such as economic results, or should the perceptions of managers and employees over the outcomes be considered? Until questions like these can be resolved in empirical research, it will not be easy to judge whether BPR, in any manifestation, is successful or not.
Both of these problems can be traced to the underlying assumption that BPR is something that exerts a causal force on organizational performance. In theoretical terms, the logic employed is one of determination, in which variation in one variable accounts for (or determines) variation in another variable. The logic of determination underlies imperative reasoning, such as that linking changes in information technology with organizational change (Markus and Robey, 1988; Robey, 1995) . Applied to BPR, deterministic logic suggests that BPR programmes (however conceived) operate as an independent variable affecting organizational performance, a dependent variable. Empirical research based on deterministic logic has the straightforward objective of measuring variation on both sides of the equation and reporting statistical associations to support the central hypothesis that BPR actually does account for positive changes in organizational performance.
Clearly, the deterministic logical model underlying research on BPR cannot be directly tested if the variables on either side of the equation cannot be uniformly defined. However, as we have seen, both BPR and performance are not defined well and are operationalized differently from one study to the next. Consequently, research has produced no compelling evidence that BPR has had the effects expected of it. Rather, BPR is seen as poorly understood and contradictory. Later in this paper, we will deal with an alternative theoretical logic, the "logic of contradiction", that is better equipped to cope with the types of inconsistencies found in BPR research.
Problems in conception, measurement, and logical specification jointly contribute to the conclusion that BPR is inherently contradictory. We now turn to an examination of fundamental contradictions that have been identified in the rhetoric of BPR.
Understanding the contradictions of process re-engineering Four contradictions potentially undermine the application of BPR. First, we examine the fallacy that re-engineering can obliterate existing processes, thereby "cleaning the slate" for newer, IT-enabled processes. Second, we examine the paradoxical role of IT in enabling new work processes, arguing that IT can be both an enabler and disabler of organizational improvement. Third, we examine the hypocrisy embedded in the claim that re-engineering empowers workers. Since BPR projects frequently document efficiencies gained by workforce reduction, the claim of empowerment may be challenged as a smokescreen for radical downsizing. Finally, we discuss the irony of employee commitment to re-engineering efforts. Though special commitments are needed to make BPR succeed, participants may unwittingly erode the commitment of the organization to themselves.
The fallacy of the clean slate
One of the guiding principles of BPR is the assumption that new processes be designed "from scratch" using a clean slate. The clean-slate approach implies disregarding existing structures and procedures in order to invent new ways of accomplishing work (Hammer and Champy, 1993) . BPR, according to the purists, should be distinguished from less radical approaches designed to improve the performance of existing processes -e.g. continuous business improvement and total quality management (Brandt, 1994; Carr and Johansson, 1995; Hammer and Champy, 1993) . Moreover, the clean-slate approach presupposes spending little time analysing current business processes in order not to be influenced by current practices and, ideally, to eliminate the assumptions underlying these actual processes.
Such reasoning is fallacious because even the most radically redesigned business processes need to be implemented in real organizations that have histories and memories. Re-engineering design teams cannot wipe clean the slates that members of the organization carry in their heads, nor can they obliterate the shared understandings and mental models that have accrued over time. As noted by Davenport (1995) , existing constraints have to be taken into account during implementation of BPR plans. In practice then, the appealing rhetoric of obliterating existing processes and beginning anew with a blank slate poses a logical impossibility. This fallacy fuels much of the contemporary scepticism regarding BPR's claims of effectiveness.
Blank slates also pose practical difficulties. Davenport and Stoddard (1994) have noted that radical innovations requiring obliteration of existing processes may simply cost too much to obtain top management support. The blank slate too often implies a "blank cheque" at implementation, especially where advanced information technologies are advocated (as they usually are) (Davenport and Stoddard, 1994, p. 123) . Thus, even if existing processes could be wiped clean, few organizations seem prepared to finance the mass migration towards an unproven future. Several reports support this concern with the observation that truly radical change has been rare (Grint et al., 1996; Maglitta, 1995; Robey et al., 1995) .
A modification to the extreme BPR rhetoric has been offered by Davenport and Stoddard (1994) to cope with the blank slate fallacy. They argue, quite reasonably, that process redesign can proceed using a blank slate, but that process implementation must acknowledge the constraints imposed by existing processes. This leads to the advice to plan for radical change, but to implement gradually. Recent case studies show that this approach is favoured by organizations (Stoddard and Jarvenpaa, 1995) . Unfortunately, while addressing the fallacy of the blank slate, this more moderate approach to BPR raises another question: why should new processes be designed without incorporating the assumptions affecting their implementation? In effect, the assumption that design and implementation are activities that can be separated is another fallacy. If designs need to be modified on implementation to account for preexisting conditions, these conditions should be taken into account during the design phase. Thus, the more moderate version of BPR does not remove the fallacious assumptions that existing organizational processes can be either removed from the equation or postponed for later consideration.
The paradox of information technology: enabler and disabler of radical change
One of the most straightforward assertions about BPR is that information technology is a key enabler of process redesign. It is information technology that "permits companies to re-engineer business processes… a company that cannot change the way it thinks about information technology cannot re-engineer" (Hammer and Champy, 1993, p. 83) . Most other BPR proponents also adopt an essentially technical model of organizational change in which information technology basically drives the re-engineering effort (Grey and Mitev, 1995; Jones, 1994) . These arguments acknowledge the technological determinism inherent to BPR; technology determines not only work structure, but also organizational structure, culture, management styles, and beliefs (Grey and Mitev, 1995) . Thus, outmoded organizational designs can be changed through the use of advanced, enabling technologies that support new business processes that respond to changing market needs.
However reasonable and straightforward this argument seems, it has also become the source of controversy. Rather than being a simple enabler of new organizational processes, information technology paradoxically can also disable an organization's ability to change. When an organization revises its basic business processes using information technology, it introduces a new structure that may become even more difficult to change in the future. Since the technical backbone of automated processes exists as software routines, a later change in process will require a reconstruction of the software application and its various links to other systems. While all changes require reprogramming of some sort, either to human or machine components, software programs are often virtually inaccessible to the persons nearest to the application. Given the inevitability of business change, "hard-wired" business processes that are built today may seriously constrain later efforts to redesign them. Ironically, today's BPR may have already produced the organizational structures and processes that will be considered outmoded tomorrow, and those processes may be more difficult to change because today's software conventions will probably also be considered outmoded tomorrow. Seen with hindsight, the BPR movement of the 1990s may later be blamed for the construction of the next generation of "legacy" systems and organizations in need of transformation. Lucas and Olson (1994) provide a clear analysis of this paradox in their examination of information technology's effects on organizational flexibility. They argue that technology provides the capability for more flexible organizational structures by allowing greater variety in the time and place of work while increasing the speed of response. However, they note that information technology also constrains flexibility by embedding routines into software programs that are not easy to change. Gill's (1995) comparable analysis of Mrs Fields' Cookies shows how information technology both enabled and disabled that organization's ability to respond to a changing business environment. By employing centralized systems for controlling production and inventory, Mrs Fields' Cookies was able to operate hundreds of small stores as it had run its original store. No middle-management layers were used, and the company achieved notoriety as an example of the more efficient, flattened hierarchy structure (Lucas, 1996) . Eventually, Gill notes, Mrs Fields' Cookies encountered problems in responding to local markets and began to experience financial difficulties. Its vaunted systems, designed to remove "unnecessary" layers of management, actually prevented top management's awareness of needed change. Since no middle-management layers existed in the company, the organization was constrained from perceiving environmental changes taking place. Paradoxically, the same technology applications that enabled the innovative centralized structure that led to corporate success were partly responsible for blinding top management to the need for change.
Resolving the paradox of information technology is not easy. Gill (1995, p. 54 ) claims that managers should not "overprogram" their organizations in search of dramatic productivity gains. To ensure greater flexibility, Lucas (1996) recommends a commitment to continuous investment in new technologies, thereby keeping any programmed routines from becoming calcified in the organization. Applying these recommendations, however, seems inconsistent with BPR's agenda to achieve radical change with quantum changes in information technology. Moreover, although Lucas's recommendation makes great sense to most systems professionals, ongoing investment hardly addresses management's concern for operating efficiency, one of the primary motivations for getting into BPR.
The hypocrisy of empowerment
The third contradiction manifest in discussions about BPR deals with the empowerment of workers at all levels of the organization. Empowerment entails sharing information with workers, basing rewards on organizational performance, training employees to contribute more to organizational performance, and involving employees in management decision making (Bowen and Lawler, 1992) . Re-engineered business processes, it is argued, result in empowered workers with greater access to information, enhanced knowledge, and the freedom to perform their jobs in ways that make sense to them. Hammer and Champy (1993) portray empowerment as an unavoidable consequence of process re-engineering. They maintain that empowered workers "make their own rules" and have the "authority to make the decisions needed to it get it done" (p. 70).
While not denying the empowering potential of some BPR programmes, sceptics have been quick to challenge the claim that empowerment results inevitably from re-engineering. Changes in the behaviour, values and attitudes of organizational members are not so easily achieved, as many years of study by behavioural scientists can attest. It is certainly debatable whether the redesign of business processes can, in and of itself, induce such behavioural changes (McKenna, 1995) . Indeed, it seems contradictory for empowerment to be characterized as a gift that can be bestowed by re-engineering. More realistically, empowerment is acquired through active struggle and achievement rather than bestowed (Grey and Mitev, 1995) .
A more incisive criticism of the empowerment rhetoric exposes it as hypocritical, motivated by management's desire to place BPR in a more politically correct and favourable light (Willmott and Wray-Bliss, 1996) . Willmott and Wray-Bliss argue that re-engineering is firmly wedded to a topdown philosophy of organizational change in which experts design the systems which employees are expected to operate. Moreover, the widespread use of information technologies to enable process change increases the surveillance to which employees are subject -whether through hierarchical monitoring or the internalization of control through processes of self-discipline and peer monitoring. The objectives and values promoted by re-engineering, and the methods proposed to instil them, also involve the coercive manipulation of attitudes and beliefs to secure cultural conformity. Finally, the assumption of consumer sovereignty inherent to BPR legitimizes the shedding of staff and increases the vulnerability of those who remain in employment. On the whole, Willmott and Wray-Bliss (1996) strongly disagree with re-engineering's claim to bestow power on employees; rather, they argue that BPR remains essentially hierarchical in its approach to organizational control. The hypocrisy lies in BPR's deployment "as a means of deriving legitimacy for a philosophy that, paradoxically, marks a reassertion of classical [and] mechanistic thinking" (p. 81).
Unlike logical fallacy or paradox, hypocrisy is somewhat easier to resolve. By simply replacing the equivocal message -that BPR is capable of both tightening and loosening of hierarchical control -with one's true intentions, one becomes less hypocritical. Unfortunately, the true intention of using information technology to reduce worker power is never likely to be expressed openly. Therefore, in practice, organizational hypocrisy is commonly present and accepted. It becomes a normal part of organizational conduct -a feature of "hypocracy" -rarely questioned or examined except by sceptical researchers [2] .
The irony of employee commitment
The fourth contradiction considered here deals with the issue of employee commitment to radical organizational change. As with most other approaches to planned organizational change, the proponents of BPR note that the commitment of individuals to a re-engineering project can make the difference between its success or failure. In addition to the widely acknowledged need to obtain the commitment and support of top managers, the literature also emphasizes the importance of commitment for "process owners," BPR team members and implementers of the redesigned processes (Melone, 1995) . In other words, the commitment and positive attitude of most of the individuals in an organization towards BPR appear to be the sine qua non condition for project success and resultant organizational improvements.
However, BPR is often a threatening proposition for members of an organization, and gaining their commitment is not easy. Guimaraes (1996) presents evidence that while BPR usually creates a richer overall work environment, lower organizational commitment occurs after business processes are re-engineered. According to Melone (1995) , it is not the redesign of processes per se that frightens people and reduces their commitment, but rather the likelihood that BPR can affect the design of these people's jobs, including the way they are evaluated, rewarded and supervised. Their whole lives, their sense of worth and their relationships to others are thus at stake in BPR. Moreover, because re-engineering is so frequently associated with the downsizing of employment, people subject to re-engineering have good reason to withhold their commitment to change efforts. Indeed, it is ironic that re-engineering seeks to secure the commitment of those who may ultimately suffer from its outcomes. Willmott (1995) wryly suggests that obtaining such commitment from doomed (yet empowered) employees is analogous to persuading turkeys to vote for Christmas! Anecdotal evidence of the irony of commitment is provided in Petrozzo and Stepper's (1994) account of one re-engineering effort in which the project leader was so dedicated that he took a "crash-and-burn" position, making the ultimate personal sacrifice of leaving the company after the project was complete.
In most cases, however, we would expect to see re-engineering's progress impeded by employees unwilling to participate wholeheartedly in a systematic programme to terminate their positions or those of their colleagues. Even when a BPR effort is restricted to certain areas of a company, employees in unaffected areas may witness the realities of re-engineering's effects upon their co-workers in other areas. Their commitment to later re-engineering may as a result diminish (Grey and Mitev, 1995) . In their minds, avoiding today's re-engineering may only be a temporary stay of execution, and knowledge of impending consequences may weaken the commitment necessary to successfully conduct future projects. When confronted with an understanding of the potential irony of participating in their own demise, employees are most unlikely to sustain their commitment to BPR efforts. In this way, the irony is removed but so is the chance of success for the BPR project. As with the hypocrisy of empowerment discussed above, honesty of intent is an unlikely recourse for managers seeking needed commitment to radical organizational change.
Coping with contradictions: theoretical avenues and practical guides
When confronted with contradictions, one hopes for a satisfactory, and often creative, resolution. However, we have seen that it is difficult to resolve the contradictions surrounding BPR. Resolving the fallacy of the blank slate and the paradox of information technology require basic alterations in BPR philosophy and method; resolving hypocrisy and irony place change efforts at jeopardy if employees withhold their commitment to change. Nonetheless, it is important to address these contradictions so that subsequent research and practice can proceed. Jones (1995) suggested three strategies for coping with the contradictions inherent in BPR: denial, resolution and accommodation. The strategy of denial refuses to acknowledge the contradictions and dismisses them as misconceptions about BPR or as the product of flawed research into BPR and its consequences. The strategy of resolution seeks to demonstrate that the apparent contradictions in BPR are actually compatible. For example, BPR may produce different effects in different contexts, and different situations may call for different requirements and premisses that may very well contradict those of other situations. Resolution occurs when these situational factors are included in a more complete analysis of BPR. Finally, the accommodation strategy posits that the contradictions in BPR should be accepted, not as a deficiency but as a normal feature of organizational life. Accommodation implies that contradictions should be accepted, studied and understood as inherent phenomena in social systems rather than ignored or resolved (Handy, 1994) . Through accommodation, we may understand the ways in which organizations and their members make sense of contradictions and even harness them as sources of energy or inspiration.
In the spirit of accommodation, we seek a more insightful theoretical understanding of the contradictions surrounding BPR. Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier in this paper, conventional thinking about BPR (and organizational change in general) is shaped by deterministic theories that cannot easily accommodate contradictory outcomes. Especially in relation to information technology, organizational change is traditionally seen as the result of causal forces or imperatives. The belief that information technology "transforms" organizations by enabling radically revised processes does not invite critical thinking about paradoxical outcomes.
Recently, however, greater attention has been drawn to theories that incorporate a "logic of contradiction" as a useful way to explain organizational change. The logic of contradiction explains organizational outcomes as the result of counteracting or dialectic forces, those promoting the organizational change and those opposing it (Ford and Ford, 1994; Poole and Van de Ven, 1989; Robey, 1995; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995) . In the remainder of this section, we demonstrate how theories of organizational learning and organizational politics, both of which include a dialectic mechanism to explain change, may guide research and practice in BPR. In particular, organizational learning is applied to the fallacy of the clean slate and the paradox of technology as enabler and disabler of change. Organizational politics is then applied to the hypocrisy of empowerment and the irony of commitment.
Organizational learning
Organizational learning regards organizations as cognitive entities, capable of reflecting on their own actions, conducting experiments to study the effects of alternative actions, and modifying actions accordingly (Fiol and Lyles, 1985) . Organizational change is mediated by revisions to "organizational memory", which consists of shared understandings about the identity of the organization, shared mental maps that relate causes to effects, and stored routines for behaviour (Duncan and Weiss 1979; Robey and Sales, 1994; Walsh and Ungson, 1991) . "Learning organizations" pursue such experiments, continuously testing out their assumptions and validating their causal mental maps (Wishart et al., 1996) .
Particularly where organizational memory is widely distributed among members, residual memory may prevent new learning unless there are established norms for experimentation and change. Herein lies the logic of contradiction and the dialectic of learning. Changes in organizational memory is not accomplished by the simple exchange of new knowledge for old.
Organizations cannot "unlearn" or forget what they already know, any more than individuals can forget who they are (Hedberg, 1981; Klein, 1989) . Rather, existing knowledge always serves as context within which new knowledge is interpreted and understood. For radical change to take place, therefore, new knowledge must be integrated with prior knowledge. New business processes, for example, can be incorporated as sensible modifications to existing practices, but they are unlikely to replace an obliterated past. Memories, by definition, continue and are sustained by cultural and institutional processes well beyond the bounds of any particular re-engineering effort. As we have argued above, the expectation that the slate can be wiped clean is inherently contradictory when one acknowledges that existing processes are embedded deeply in organizational memory.
As a theoretical approach to BPR, organizational learning draws attention to the careful balance between the exploration for new knowledge and the exploitation of existing knowledge (March, 1991) . This dialectic between the new and the old makes it useful for understanding organizational change. Robey et al. (1995) have proposed an integrative model that places BPR within the context of organizational learning. The detailed planning methods characteristic of BPR are reconceived as methods for meeting "learning objectives," established only after an assessment of existing memory and a diagnosis of organizational needs. By incorporating re-engineering within an organizational learning process, BPR's fallacious premiss of the clean slate is overcome, and the interplay between existing and desired knowledge can be examined.
Organizational learning also addresses the paradoxical nature of IT as both enabler and disabler of change. The link between information technology and organizational learning has just begun to be explored, yet it is clear that information technologies may support the learning process, as well as provide electronic repositories for certain types of knowledge (Stein and Zwass, 1995) . However, as we noted earlier, information technology may also help to disable an organization's future ability to respond to environmental change, that is, it can disable organizational learning (Gill, 1995) . Clearly, reliance upon artificial memory may diminish the importance of human memory, informal social processes, culture and history. To the extent that BPR tries to create new memory with information technology, it may unwittingly contribute to "the institutionalization and rationalization of a much wider form of memory loss" (Grint et al., 1996, p. 54) . This "amnesia writ large" may seriously disable future knowledge generation and organizational adaptability (Grint et al., 1996, p. 53) .
In addition to the ability of organizational learning theory to guide research, many practical recommendations have emerged from organizational learning. Most of these centre on the concept of the "learning organization," a potentially overworked concept that is now used indiscriminately to describe organizations capable of adaptation and change. In our view, learning organizations are those with the ability to change continuously in response to changing external demands and to be "conscious" of the process of learning and change. Many descriptions of BPR portray an organization as a machine which can be reconfigured using more advanced information technologies to replace existing mechanisms. This mechanistic portrait perpetuates the fallacy that existing processes can be obliterated in social systems and poses a paradoxical role for information technology. By using learning as a root metaphor for organizations, managers may accommodate the contradictions inherent in BPR. Practice should acknowledge the "dirty" slate of existing organizational memory and subordinate the change process to broader learning objectives that take that memory into account from the outset.
Considering these arguments, business process learning (BPL) may be a more appropriate change strategy than BPR. In BPL the search is not simply for technologies that enable the move from the present design to the next one. Rather, BPL suggests a commitment to ongoing experimentation and change. The implication for information management is a commitment for experimentation with emerging technologies to learn from them. In contrast to Lucas's (1996) call for continuing investment in new technologies, we suggest a more modest commitment to continuing knowledge about new technologies. Rather than filling blank slates with blank cheques, we urge management to expand organizational memory with knowledge about the ways that new technologies may fulfill learning objectives. A model of business process learning is presented in Figure 1 .
Organizational politics
Organizational politics is a much older theoretical perspective, but it also uses contradiction as the underlying logic for explaining social change (Benson, 1977) . Contradictions in organizations refer to the misalignment between contributions and rewards, and such contradictions are viewed as the source of energy from which efforts to change organizations arise. BPR's agenda for change is read by political analysts as a managerial attempt to oppress labour, including clerical workers, which is certainly expected to be opposed. Political contradictions are best understood dynamically by viewing current structures and processes as unstable solutions to political struggle. Thus, BPR is not a 
Redesign of business processes
Add/change objectives Update memory (with new knowledge about the organization, its environment, and how to fulfil the learning objectives)
final solution but rather a temporary equilibrium in an ongoing contest between groups, each seeking to promote its own interests. Applied to BPR, political theory easily accommodates the contradictions identified earlier as the hypocrisy of empowerment and the irony of commitment. In place of the idealistic belief that all interests can be served by BPR, political analysis assumes that divergent interests drive a dialectic and contradictory process in which winners and losers both emerge. Technologies employed in the service of any party's agenda are immediately suspected of being technologies of control rather than empowerment. Information itself is regarded as a political and strategic resource because intelligence about opponents' activities allows the formulation of more advantageous political moves. For researchers studying the "effects" of advanced information technologies, political theory directs attention both to the interests of those promoting particular objectives of transformation and to the interests of those opposing it. Managers may embed social controls within applications of information technologies while masking their motives with rhetoric about empowerment and efficiency, and workers may sabotage the effort and withdraw commitment.
Political analyses offer practical guides to managers, who are advised to acknowledge the oppositional power relations between themselves and stakeholders who are potentially harmed by BPR projects. Drawing on their investigation of four case studies, Smith and Willcocks (1995) stressed the importance of the management of politics within any major change process such as re-engineering. According to them, politics needs to be explicitly managed since it contributes to an important part of the success of BPR projects. It appears that in practice, the neglect of this aspect often underlies disappointment of stakeholders' expectations, not least those of senior management. Therefore, instead of drowning stakeholders in confusing rhetoric about empowerment and commitment, managers should confront opposing interests and negotiate acceptable compromises. Whether harmonious or acrimonious, negotiation allows parties to place their interests on the table and use their power in ways to secure what they can. Clearly, no parties to negotiation expect to gain everything that they want, and political theories are explicit about the limits of influence. In this way, political theory can aid managers in developing a more realistic strategy for implementing process change.
We do not mean to restrict the analysis of BPR's contradictory outcomes to just two theories. Institutional theory (Scott, 1995) , organizational culture (Martin, 1992) , and structuration (Giddens, 1984) are also promising avenues for BPR research and practice. Each incorporates the basic idea that organizations can be changed proactively, yet each also acknowledges the presence of stable characteristics that are not likely to change, even in the face of new technologies. Thus, a dialectic is established wherein change occurs through the interaction of opposing forces. This logic of contradiction contrasts with the simpler logic of determination in which one element (e.g. information technology) accounts for organizational change. Examples of these theories are provided elsewhere (Robey, 1995; Robey, in press ), but the parallels to the learning and political theories considered here are clear.
Conclusion
There is little need to reinforce the importance of gaining a better understanding of BPR in today's business environment. The frequency of BPR programmes, the amount of effort and resources invested in them, and the mixed results obtained, all point to the need for better research and better practice. At present, BPR is beset by controversy and contradiction. Some aspects of the basic concept of re-engineering seem inherently fallacious and paradoxical, and the treatment of workers seems hypocritical and ironic in practice. Our purpose is not to condemn BPR or its proponents for their logical shortcomings but rather to advise researchers and practitioners on means for coping with BPR's many contradictions.
Our primary aim can be summarized by advising researchers to explore theories that accommodate logical and empirical contradictions. In place of the simple deterministic reasoning that governs research on organizational change -ideas such as the technological imperative, for example -we advocate theories that incorporate a logic of contradiction. In such theories, opposing forces interact to cause resulting solutions that are only partially predictable. The dynamic and nondeterministic nature of such theories may frustrate conventional attempts to produce and validate causal models, but such theories have definite advantages for explaining complex phenomena such as organizational change. From the vantage point of deterministic theory, the mixed empirical results might be taken as evidence that BPR does not work and should be abandoned. Alternative theories may better explain why these mixed results occur and how contradictory practices can be understood. It is time for researchers interested in BPR to acknowledge the fact that it is a complex phenomenon of social and technical change, not a cookbook for quantum performance improvements.
It is also important for those undertaking BPR in practice to confront its contradictions rather than to deny or rationalize them. The tantalizing appeal of the blank slate assumption should not blind managers to the fallacy that social memories cannot be erased. Information technologies can certainly be seen as powerful tools which enable new processes, but their constraints must also be understood. Organizational learning theory can guide practice with respect to these first two contradictions.
Perhaps more importantly, the human resource implications of BPR need to be dealt with more realistically. No one is really fooled by hypocritical rhetoric that speaks of empowerment while jobs are eliminated by the thousands. People will not sensibly commit time and effort into major programmes of change that eliminate their own roles in organizational success. Political theory has long provided the necessary guidance to effective negotiations with stakeholders. We suggest that human resource issues be considered more honestly and that manpower reductions be negotiated directly.
